|

THE NEED FOR RISK
MANAGEMENT
Presented at the Mid-America
Institute's Conference Series of Risk Management,
Chicago, Illinois,
May 30, 1990.

Risk management, as an orthodox
discipline of business, is a relatively new concept. It came into
being during the last two decades in concert with the development
of a vast array of innovative financial instruments, techniques,
information technologies, and the development of financial futures
and options.
In great measure financial
futures and options owe their phenomenal success to the recognition
and acceptance by the commercial world of the concept of risk management.
That this process occurred as quickly and successfully as it did
is primarily due to the profound efforts and influence of the U.S.
academic community.
Of particular note in this
intellectual endeavor is Merton H. Miller, the Robert R. McCormick
Distinguished Service Professor of the Graduate School of Business,
University of Chicago. His contribution to the genre of risk management
was partially responsible for his selection in 1990, together with
Harry Markowitz and William Sharpe, as the Nobel Laureate in Economics.

Walter B. Wriston, referring
to the revolutionary changes in our civilization brought about the
marriage between computer technology and telecommunications, described
it as the information revolution. Information and to some
degree, knowledgeis today transmitted at lightening speed
to every corner of the planet. Consequently, the velocity of social
and political change has greatly accelerated, the sanctity of every
political power structure is in question, separate economies are
being forged into one global marketplace, and the traditional regime
of financial management is in transformation. Indeed, the consequences
are dramatic, draconian, and global. Dr. Carver Mead of the California
Institute of Technology said it this way: "The entire Industrial
Revolution enhanced productivity by a factor of about a hundred,
but the microelectronic revolution has already enhanced productivity
in information-based technology by a factor of more than a millionand
the end isn't in sight yet."
Two decades ago, financial
risk was apt to be defined as the possibility of suffering financial
loss. At that time, it was doubtful many thought of risk management
as a discipline, nor was it likely that many outside of academia
or the actuarial business spent much time tinkering with mathematical
models in order to weigh different strains of strategic exposure;
i.e., a firm's sensitivity to changes in tax rates, interest
rates, exchange rates, the price of oil, etc. Two decades ago, the
identifiable risks were the rough equivalent of what Claude Rains
in the final scenes of Casablanca told his lackeys: "round
up the usual suspects." Farmers, for example, have always been at
the mercy of the weather. Beyond that, there were all the usual
insurable risks: fire, theft, natural disasters, etc. And while
recessions came and went, it was an era in which Treasury instruments
yielded about 5 percent and foreign exchange rates were fixed.
Today, by virtue of Mr. Wriston's
information revolution, "we are witnessing a galloping new system
of international finance" . . .one that differs radically from its
precursors" in that, as he notes, it "was not built by politicians,
economists, central bankers or finance ministers. . .it was built
by technology. . .by men and women who interconnected the planet
with telecommunications and computers. . .and assembled a global
financial marketplace that would. . .as a first step. . .replace
the Bretton Woods agreements. . .with a new international monetary
system governed by the Information Standard." Defined in the context
of the world of commerce as we know it in the 1990s, risk is not
merely a potential drought, earthquake, gas leak or even oil spill.
In today's interdependent world: Where two contaminated grapes are
found in Philadelphia and, a hemisphere away, Chilean farmers suffer
$100 million in losses as a result; Where Europeans worry about
growth hormones fed to cattle and American beef growers suffer the
consequences; Where Bundesbank monetary policy must be weighed right
along with that of the Fed; Where a head tax imposed in London can
affect the corporate bottom line every bit as readily as a value-added
tax levied by Washington; Where a drop in the Nikkei average can
trigger a decline in every other stock market in the world; Where
the U.S. budget and trade deficits impact not just the American
economy, but the economies of all nations and all those who are
business participants; Where the coming of Europe 1992 is not just
a national or even a pan-European issue, but one that has profound
investment and trade implications to every businessman; Where the
revolutionary events in Eastern-Europe and Russia structurally change
the strategy of all commerce and commercial enterprise; and, Where
every action in any part of the world is immediately known by everyone
else.
In such a world, risk is radically
more complicated, intensely more concentrated and devastatingly
swift. Risk, today, is any one of a myriad of contingencies that
could negatively impact an enterprise, thereby altering either its
value, its cash flow, or its future. More globalization, greater
interdependence, immediate access to markets of choice, more sophisticated
techniques, intensified competitionthese are clearly the trends
of the future. In a word, the management of risk has became integral
to our well being. However, while risk management as a discipline
may be new, the idea of managing risk is anything but new. Nor did
the idea originate in Chicago.
The European trade fairs in
the 1100s became the commercial marketplaces of medieval Europe
and established Lettres de faire as the early mechanism for
forward contracting. A couple of hundred years later, Lloyd's Coffee
House became a central meeting place in London for individuals involved
in marine insuranceand incidentally insurance against "house-breaking
and death by gin-drinking." In the late 1600s, in Osaka, Japan,
the feudal clans that had established warehouses to store and sell
rice collected as land tax realized they needed protection from
wide harvest-to-harvest price fluctuations. These feudal lord merchants
did the sensible thing and established the first organized futures
exchangethe Dojima Rice Market. As a consequence, Osaka became
the leading commercial Japanese city of that era. However, to find
the real source of risk management, one must regress some 5000 years
in history to when Joseph convinced the Pharaoh to arrange for the
first long grain hedge in order to protect against the coming seven
years of lean.
American futures history, on
the other hand, extends back to the mid-nineteenth century. Indeed,
by time of the Great Fire of 1871, Chicago had already become this
country's hub of transportation. As a consequence, merchants who
dealt in raw commodities gathered in Chicago to contract for thembuying
and selling in both a spot and forward fashion. It was inevitable
that these merchants would soon think along the same lines as their
earlier counterparts in London or Osaka.
The first centralized trading
facility to serve part of this market was the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT) established in 1848. Initially its membership was comprised
of the actual grain merchants; but soon it was clear that commodity
trading presented attractive opportunities to speculators as well.
Indeed, just as Adam Smith explained, speculatorsin pursuing
their own interestswere making the markets more liquid and
stable.
The second Chicago exchange,
founded on South Water Street in 1874, traded butter, eggs, poultry
and other farm products. By the end of World War I, the Butter and
Egg Board (as it was then called), had evolved into the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME). Seventy years later, annual trading volume
at the CME would exceed 100 million contracts. But on December 1,
1919, the first day of trading at the new CME, volume was a bit
more modest. Only three cars of eggs were traded.
In the early 1970s, the Bretton
Woods Agreementthe post-world war pact that instituted a fixed-exchange
rate regime for the major world nations had begun to show
its structural flaw. Finance ministers were finding it increasingly
difficult to dictate the value of currencies relative the dollar
in a world where value changes were constant and information and
capital free flowing. On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced
an emergency economic package that sent a seismic shock through
the entire financial world. On that day, the United States suspended
the dollar's convertibility into gold thereby ending fixed exchange
rates between currencies.
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange
was the first major futures exchange to recognize the market potential
of the upheavals unleashed by this event. Supported by Nobel laureate
Milton Friedman, the CME was the first exchange to assert that the
principles of agricultural commodities futures could be applied
successfully to financial instruments. Thus, currency futureswhich
began trading on the CME's International Monetary Market (IMM) on
May 16, 1972ushered in the era of financial futures, thereby
forever changing the scope and utility of futures markets. One year
later, the Chicago Board of Trade launched the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE) and added a new dimension to the repertoire of risk
management instruments. Three years later, Treasury bond futures
at the Chicago Board of Trade made their debut and became the most
actively-traded financial instrument. Within a decade, a vibrant
new industry was born that subsequently opened the curtain on the
index markets of the 1980s. The successes of these markets propelled
the futures and options industry to unparalleled greatness. In the
last decade alone, the volume in U.S. futures and options skyrocketed
from 76 million contracts in 1979 to a record of 323 million contracts
in 1989. These successes also prompted University of Chicago Professor
Merton H. Miller, 1990 Nobel laureate in Economics, to nominate
financial futures as "the most significant financial innovation
of the last twenty years."
Chicago, with its rich history
and tradition of forward marketing, insurers and reinsurers, with
its innovative banks, and its robust futures and options exchanges
will remain the risk management capital of the world. However, aside
from providing Chicago with an enviable local economic engine, there
are three additional direct consequences that resulted from the
need the Chicago markets demonstrated: it provided an impetus for
the development of futures markets worldwide; it spawned the introduction
of risk management as a discipline; and it spurred the devolvement
of secondary off-exchange products. All three consequences were
predictable.
Clearly, our Chicago successes
could not go unnoticed. Indeed, our very markets themselves began
to be replicated all over the world. During this past decade, new
financial futures exchanges have opened or been announced in London,
Paris, Hong Kong, Sydney, Toronto, Singapore, New Zealand, Brazil,
Osaka, Zurich, Dublin, Frankfurt and Tokyo. Four years ago, there
were fifty-two exchanges worldwide, now there are seventy-two. Non-U.S.
futures and options volume increased from virtually zero just five
years ago to a record volume of 180 million contracts last year.
During the same five years, U.S. market share fell from nearly 100%
of total world volume to 64% in 1989.
By becoming integral to the
financial landscape of the U.S. and the international establishment,
futures and options markets gained an ever-increasing universe of
users. Consequently, these markets are today utilized by investment
bankers and broker-dealers, by foreign exchange traders and government
securities dealers, by banks and insurance companies, by pension
funds and mutual funds, and by corporations and financial institutions
of every sort. Indeed, futures and options markets became a common
denominator for professional money managers worldwide, providing
impetus for expanded utilization of these markets generally and
acting as catalyst for the development of the risk management regime.
The liquid markets of the established
futures and options exchanges became a crucible of ideas for off-exchange
products. Banks, in particular, became key players in an expanding
off-exchange market for hybrid products such as interest-rate swaps
and caps, forward rate agreements, floors and collars, etc.; not
to speak of off-exchange trading systems and techniques for exchange
products, the Exchange For Physicals (EFPs). While these hybrids
represent somewhat of a threat and a liquidity drain to the exchange
markets, in the final analysis, off-exchange products result in
producing more business for the broad underlying exchange-traded
instruments. For instance, both in swaps as well as in caps, a bank
will shed its assumed interest rate exposure by hedging in the indicated
futures market. In the future, we can expect innovation to intensify,
and the demand for tailored risk management strategies to increase.
This may tend to blur the lines between exchange-traded and off-exchange-traded
products. It is important to note, however, that exchange-traded
products have one additional important advantage for the financial
community to consider, they provide a built-in mechanism for risk
assessment. The financial risk of recent innovative instruments
applied in an off-exchange environment makes them nearly impossible
to be measured and poses a great unknown financial risk to the banking
community.
The Chicago exchanges were
never laggards in innovation or intimidated by competition. Indeed,
in 1984, the CME recognized that the financial world was at the
threshold of Wriston's technological revolutionone that would
increase international competition for our marketsand became
the first futures exchange to establish a mutual-offset trading
link with a foreign exchangethe Singapore International Monetary
Exchange (SIMEX). Similarly, the CBOT, instituted a successful evening
session for its U.S. Treasury bond futures contract.
The CME ultimately concluded
that the futures industry must make the giant leap toward automated
technology if it is to respond to the demands of globalization.
Thus, in 1986, in conjunction with Reuters Holdings PLC, the CME
set about developing GLOBEX. GLOBEX represents the logical extension
of the financial futures revolution that began in 1972 with the
IMM. It is the only realistic response to the information revolution
which demands there be an efficient and cost-effective capability
for managing risk around-the-clock. In conjunction with the open
outcry sessions of the American business hours, GLOBEX will provide
investors around the world with a single, 24-hour futures and options
trading system.
Our goal is to make GLOBEX
the premier international futures and options trading system and
the standard for the world. Toward that goal, MATIF, the Paris-based
Marche a Terme International de France, was the first exchange
to become a GLOBEX partner. Most importantly, however, last week,
on May 23, 1990, the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange successfully completed their extensive discussions pertaining
to a unified after-hours electronic trading system, and announced
a plan whereby both exchanges would utilize the GLOBEX network and
technology. This agreement followed the announcement by the Japanese
Ministry of Finance that GLOBEX was approved for Japan. Thus, subject
to final agreement by Reuters Holdings PLC, GLOBEX will some day
become the electronic trading system for over 75% of the world's
financial futures and options when it becomes operational.
The agreement between the two
Chicago exchanges proved once again that Chicago's "I can" tradition
is alive and well. Indeed, we have helped transform this city from
Carl Sandburg's Hog Butcher for the World to today's capital of
risk management. But much more than that. The futures and options
exchanges of Chicagolight years ahead of their counterparts
in securitieshave led the capital markets of this nation into
the next century. In doing so, we have exemplified the innovative
genius of the American people and created the tools with which riska
permanent fixture of modern businesscan better be managed.
The rest is up to you.
Return to top of page | Return
to Index | Home Page
DISCLAIMER:
This page is for information purposes. The information was obtained
from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation is made
as to the accuracy or reliability. Neither the information, nor
any opinion expressed, constitutes a solicitation or the purchase
or sale of any securities, commodities, financial instruments or
services. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
|