|
Transformation
of Futures Exchanges
Comments
Edited for The New Economy
By
Leo Melamed
January,
2002

Allow
me to briefly examine the transformation occurring on futures
exchanges and the effects of September 11, 2001. The issues
center around the pace of their evolution and give rise to
several interconnected questions. When will open-outcry be
totally replaced by electronic trade? Is there a continued
necessity for a centralized transaction system in an e-commerce
world? And is there a use for the traditional trading floor
in an age of electronic automation?
The
confrontation between traditional open-outcry methodologies
and technological advancements that permeated the marketplace
has been brewing for over a decade. But the immediate catalyst
of the war that unfolded was the 1998 SEC promulgation allowing
alternative trading systems. It caused a swarm of electronic
communications etworks, so-called ECNs, to be created. ECNs
can and do encroach the traditional turf of exchanges and represent
the greatest threat in the battle for transactional dominance.
There
are different types of business models among ECNs. Most of
them end up serving different client needs, but their most
significant difference is that some are destination networks,
which are principally execution systems, and others are simply
routing mechanisms. There are literally hundreds of them, and
their sheer number makes one suspect of the genre. It is inevitable
that many of them face the same dismal fate of a multitude
of B2Bs and “dot-coms” that sprung up during the height of
the Internet bubble. Still, those providing the greatest value
added will flourish.
While
to a large degree the battle is between ECNs and traditional
exchanges—specifically futures exchanges— it must be understood
that many of these platforms were created in conjunction with
traditional broker-dealers and nearly all are owned by consortia
of market participants, many of which are broker-dealers. At
the heart of the tug-of-war are three basic issues: (1) Where
is liquidity best achieved? (2) Where can a participant receive
secure processing, clearing, and banking facilities for the transaction?
and (3) In what forum will a participant achieve the best price
at the lowest cost? The transaction system that provides the
best combination of answers to these three propositions will
dominate.
That
liquidity is a mandatory element for success of any transaction
system is a given. Without it there is no market. One needs not
dwell on this point; examples of failed systems because of a
lack of liquidity are legion. In comparing who offers the most
of what, I will simply state that with respect to liquidity there
is no contest. It is the hallmark of traditional futures exchanges.
Can this hurdle be overcome by ECNs? Yes, it has happened—Eurex’s
wresting of the Bund contract from LIFFE is the clearest example
of such a case—but it is a rare event and doesn’t come easy.
Especially not if an exchange is alert to the threat and takes
the indicated measures.
This
brings us to the ability to clear, process and settle transactions.
To stay viable in an e-commerce world, a transaction system must
provide this capability or partner with someone that can. Again,
clearing, processing and banking on a multilateral basis has
historically been the strong suit of traditional exchanges. This
is not a skill ECNs are born with. Indeed, existing clearing
organizations, sensing an opening in the battle, are stretching
their reach to provide greater value to member firms and even
extending their clearing services beyond the traditional markets.
Finally,
can a centralized marketplace do better than the ECN in achieving
the best price at the lowest cost? On one side is the contention
that centralization is necessary for order competition — in
other words, to achieve the best price. Again, this would point
to the centralized marketplace which maximizes order flow.
On the other side is the contention that fragmentation maximizes
venue competition — in other words, it offers competitive efficiencies
to achieve the best “all-in” cost.
Long
before the terrorist attacks, there was mounting acceptance
by users that centralized exchanges provide the best combination
of the necessary three requirements: liquidity, clearing, and
best execution at the lowest cost. Since September 11 this
view has been greatly enhanced by a coincidental consequence
of the attacks. More than ever, users want to take fewer chances.
There is much less tolerance for experimentation. “Carry out
my business on a forum that has withstood the test of time, that
has established expertise, and that has unquestionable financial
integrity”is the message we are getting. That message was certainly
fortified — by an order of magnitude — as a consequence of the
recent Enron experience. Indeed, EnronOnline seemed to epitomize
a successful ECN providing worldwide energy and related financial
trading facilities. Its sudden failure sent a troubling signal
to the trading community about the reliability of a private
ECN, even one as large as Enron seemed to be.
Moreover,
because a sophisticated application programming interface (API)
serves to mask the geographical location of both the matching
engine as well as the clearing facility, the technological revolution
actually favors centralized exchanges. By virtue of an API, every
broker-dealer can plug into any sophisticated transaction system
it chooses as well as clear its trade at the clearing facility
of its choice. This gives the traditional exchanges a huge leg
up.
We
are then left with the questions of electronic versus open-outcry
trade and the continued necessity of the traditional trading
floor. To me it has been clear for a very long time that with
the coming of the technological revolution, screen-based trading
will overtake the traditional pit-trading environment. It is
axiomatic. At the core of the technological revolution lies the
capacity to collect orders, transmit them, and execute them in
nanoseconds. Technology provides speed, efficiency and lower
costs.
It
was that belief that led us at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
to propose Globex way back in 1987 before any other futures exchange
in the world considered making such a revolutionary proposal.
Since then, of course, the world has embraced the concept of
electronic trade. In Europe there are no open-outcry exchanges
left to speak of; in Asia this trend is recognized as well.
In the U.S. the pace toward a full electronic replacement has
been much slower. But with September 11 and the danger of
a trading disruption that can incapacitate a trading floor
— such as happened for the first time in its history of the
NYSE — the pace toward electronic transaction systems is bound
to accelerate.
The
issues are complex. American futuress exchanges have a long
history of successful open-outcry trading. Our floor trading
community still represents a majority of our ownership. Thus,
the livelihood of our owners is to a large degree dependent on
a floor-based system. At the CME we have spent a good deal of
time educating our members. They have learned to accept the reality
that some day the floor will cease to function. But we have agreed
with them that the exact date is uncertain. Instead, we have
struck a bargain with the floor members. While we have no doubt
that ultimately electronics and automation will prevail to the
exclusion of the trading pit, we will let the market itself determine
the exact date for this transformation. Without a doubt, September
11 has quickened this metamorphosis. In the meantime the CME
operates in dual fashion. We maintain our trading floor and
continue to expand the capabilities of Globex in order to provide
the best electronic system possible.
I
would also argue that when open-outcry goes, so will the purpose
of the trading floor as we have come to know it. But in my view,
the trading floor can be transformed into an important resource
of a centralized exchange. It should become an “Electronic Arcade.”
To understand the rationale behind this thought, one must understand
that a trading floor was always more than simply the place where
a transaction occurred. It was a gathering place for traders
where new ideas could germinate from old ones. It is precisely
the reason that giant trading floors at banks and investment
houses exist. While the trades their employees make may be executed
strictly in a technological fashion, the traders shout at each
other and information as well as ideas are easily passed. There
are private electronic trading rooms springing up throughout
the marketplace. A large electronic trading arena sponsored by
a centralized exchange can be an important addition in the evolution
toward automation.
The
good news is that for futures markets, there is one unchanging
constant: Uncertainty lies at their very foundation. Case
in point, the volume statistics at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
Since the first of the Federal Reserve reductions in the federal
funds rates that began in January of this year, the CME continued
to achieve record volumes. So much is therefore clear: The management
of risk is the bedrock of futures exchanges. The prospect of
any economic dislocation, the potential for any change in value
or price, the expectation of any alteration in economic policies
or behavior, whether it be the result of international upheaval
or the consequence of domestic disruption in business flows,
are the natural drivers of transaction volume on futures exchanges.
The events of September 11 served to underscore this truth.
* * *
Return
to top of page | Return to
Index | Home Page
|