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Derivatives,
Defined, Described and Distinguished
By Leo Melamed
Peking
University
Beijing, China
March 13, 2008

Derivatives
Defined
Everyone in the financial world is talking
about derivatives. Precious few know what they are talking about.
In truth before 1990, one would be hard-pressed to find the word
derivatives in financial textbooks, nor would you have encountered
the acronyms like SWAPS, CDO's or SIVS and so on. In 2006 you would
have to scour the pages of the Wall Street Journal to find even
one mention of SIV. Today, it is literally impossible to open the
pages of national or international financial publications without
encountering those acronyms again and again.
The reason is quite simple. The financial instruments we are
talking about are a modern invention, a consequence of computer
technology. As we all know computer technology changed the course
of civilization. It enabled mankind to peer into the fundamental
components of nature and manipulate them. I have often stated,
computer technology moved mankind from the big to the little,
from macro to micro --- from looking at the universe in its entirety
to discovering the smallest forms of matter. Just as technology
enabled mankind to discover subatomic particles in physical science,
just as technology enabled us to discover the genetic code in
biological science, so technology enabled us to manipulate components
of risk in financial science. With computer technology, financial
engineers learned to divide risks inherent in stocks, bonds,
foreign exchange and commodities into their basic components.
In other words, to disaggregate, repackage, and redistribute
risks and their corresponding rewards, exchanging one set of
risks and rewards for another that responded better to an investors'
preferences. We entered the era of particle finance which impacted
every aspect of markets and investments.
The simplest definition
of derivatives is that they are instruments of finance --- the value
of which is determined by reference to one or more underlying
assets or indices. They are used as a management tool to enhance
investment returns or protect against inherent business exposures
in foreign exchange rates, interest rates, equity values, and
commodity prices.
[The China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), in promulgating "Interim
Rules on Derivative Business of Financial Institutions," offered
a similar definition: A type of financial contract the value
of which is determined by reference to one or more underlying
assets or indices, including forward, swap, option and other
transactions with derivatives features." ]
Derivatives today are applied within two separate regimes: Over-The-Counter
(OTC) derivatives, traded privately among banks and their large
corporate and institutional customers; and Exchange-traded derivatives,
financial and commodity futures and options. Combined, these
two sectors represent a multi-trillion-dollar market.
Today, the derivative markets, both OTC and exchange traded,
provide risk management capabilities on a vast array of products
from finance to energy, from securities to the environment, from
banking to agriculture. Derivatives are used by domestic and
international banks, public and private pension funds, investment
companies, mutual funds, hedge funds, energy providers, asset
and liability managers, mortgage companies, swap dealers, and
insurance companies.
OTC derivatives markets have been enormously successful and
have grown rapidly since the BIS began monitoring them in 1995.
Notional amounts outstanding of OTC derivatives of all types
increased more than tenfold between 1995 and 2007, a growth rate
of over 20% per year.1 OTC global growth over the past 10 years
went from $150 trillion in 1997 to about $950 trillion in 2007.
Similarly, global exchange-traded derivatives grew from $38.6
trillion in 1994 to $400 trillion in 2007. Their growth at the
CME, for instance, the world's largest futures exchange, has
been dramatic. Annual CME average daily volume (ADV) has risen
from 917 thousand in 2000 to 11 million in 2007. CME Equities
products grew from 258 thousand contracts in 2000 to over 2 million
in 2007. CME Interest Rate products grew from 560 thousand in
2000 to 3.6 million in 2007. CME FX global products grew from
76 thousand in 2000 to 555 thousand in 2007. This phenomenal
story speaks for itself.
Derivatives Described
It is estimated that over 90% of the world's 500 largest companies
use derivatives on exchanges and OTC to help manage their business
exposure. With prudent risk controls in place, for the vast
majority of financial managers these risk management tools
have worked exceptionally well. Used properly, they allowed
market risks to be adjusted quickly, more precisely, and at
lower cost than is possible with any other financial procedure.
A process that has improved national productivity, growth and
standards of living.2 However, these complex and sophisticated
financial tools require expert comprehension. Used improperly,
they can create unacceptable risk.
One striking difference between the OTC market and futures exchanges
is that:
• Derivatives
traded on exchanges are generally standardized bench-mark
products like currencies, interest rates and equities. They
provide risk management to an entire asset class --- call it
the big.
• On
the other hand, the OTC market has created an array of derivatives
products that are narrow-based, non-standard, and often tailored
to the needs of a specific customer or group of customers --- call
it the little.
Allow me to briefly describe two of the most utilized OTC derivatives,
the ones you have been reading about recently: The Collateralized
Debt Obligation, CDO; and The Structured Investment Vehicle,
SIV.
The
CDO:
Since
their introduction in the late 1980s, CDOs became the fastest
growing sector of the asset-backed synthetic securities market.
It begins when an Investment Bank creates a CDO and provides
it with an inventory of asset backed securities. The collateral
assets are restricted to debt, e.g. corporate bonds, emerging
market bonds, asset backed securities, mortgage backed securities,
REITs, bank debt, bank loans, and other credit derivatives. Although
CDOs vary in structure and underlying collateral, the basic principle
is the same.
The CDO entity then slices the assets and liabilities into tranches
by reference to credit risk and income. Rating agencies rate
the tranches. The CDO now sells the tranches (cash flows coupled
with inherent risk) to investors based on their risk objectives.
The investors take a position not in the underlying assets, but
in the CDO entity that defined the risk and reward of the inventory.
Consequently investors are not simply dependent on the quality
of the inventory but also on the quality of the calculations
made by the creators of the CDO model. That is critical to understand:
Values are not determined by mark-to-market, but by the calculations
in the model. The greater risk pieces of a CDO pay greater returns
to their investors. The Investment Bank gets management fees
for managing the CDO.
The
SIV:
A
SIV is an OTC structured investment vehicle. The concept,
initiated in 1988, was very novel. Similar to a CDO, it can be
likened to a virtual bank. A bank could create a fund that would
borrow money --- short term --- by issuing commercial paper close to
the interest rate of LIBOR. Then it uses the money to lend --- long
term --- by investing in Asset Backed Securities and Mortgage Backed
Securities (mortgages, credit cards, student loans and similar
products). Liabilities are again sliced into tranches by reference
to the credit risk and then rating agencies would rate the tranches.
The tranches are sold to investors based on their risk objectives.
The difference between the earnings on the bonds and the interest
on the commercial paper represents the profit for the investors
of the SIV. Since the bank does not take the credit risk, it
can keep the SIVs debt off its balance sheet while receiving
a management fee from the SIV. The SIV industry grew to become
a $400 billion industry.3
My purpose here today is to define, describe and distinguish
derivatives. It is decidedly not to assess U.S. or global economic
conditions. Still, it is difficult to accomplish my assignment
without at least a brief mention of the fact that global economic
conditions have deteriorated. Not being an economist it is not
for me to point fingers. Indeed, there is no single culprit with
plenty of blame to go around. But clearly the root cause can
be found first in the fact that during the past decade the world
became awash with liquidity resulting in a global economic bubble.
Easy credit created a pyramid of debt. Second, greed led to a
lack of financial discipline. Finally, lack of proper risk management
controls.
I suppose much of what went wrong lies in the propensity for
human nature to take a good thing too far. It is as true in finance
as it is in every form of human endeavor. Cheap credit induced
a housing boom, especially in the U.S. It was grounded in the
fallacious belief that housing values will go up forever. Risk
became excessively underpriced. As home prices and mortgage lending
boomed, bankers found ever-more-clever ways to repackage trillions
of dollars in loans, selling them off in slivers to investors
around the world. In a rush for better returns some banks abandoned
common sense. They disregarded proper risk controls. They borrowed
money short-term and invested it long-term without regard to
credit considerations. It was a recipe for disaster. The CDOs
and SIVs had a role in that result, becoming tools for this dangerous
application. Randal Forsyth, the financial writer for Barron's
offered the following analogy: He suggested that just as steroids,
a modern medical invention, helped the performance of baseball
players, SIVs, a modern financial invention, helped the performance
of banks. The use of SIVs was of course not illegal, but the
analogy is valid since their purpose was to keep the given risk
off the bank's balance sheets. In doing so the bank's returns
looked much better. Until, that is, the market itself forced
the truth to come out.
The
problems unfolded when subprime mortgage loans in the U.S.
began to have trouble meeting their mortgage obligations. In
the summer of 2007 weaknesses in the short-term debt market soon
sparked a broader credit crisis. The financial world watched
with increasing concern as the commercial-paper market --- on
which SIVs rely for much of their funding --- began showing
severe strain. The difference between the yields on Treasury
bill --- safe investments --- and corporate commercial paper
grew sharply. Soon short-term rates skyrocketed and short-term
lenders disappeared. The emergency actions by world central
bankers did little to stop a contraction of credit and cascading
of defaults. The rest is history: Stock markets throughout
the world became pressured, consumer confidence fell, market
volatility increased, the U.S. housing market fell into disarray,
unemployment rose, and high energy and food prices, coupled
with a continued drop in U.S. currency values accelerated an
inflationary effect. The consequential result has brought the
U.S. unto the brink of a recession.
Today, the
depth of the problem has been recognized. Regulators from France,
Germany, Switzerland, the UK and the US issued a joint report,
released a few days ago, on March 6, 2008, which stated the
obvious: Major banks and securities firms that have suffered
huge credit losses failed to understand the inherent risks
of the securities they bought. Bank losses, the report stated,
were incurred by "concentrated exposure to securitizations
of U.S. subprime mortgage-related credit....In particular, some
firms made a strategic decision to retain large exposure to super-senior
tranches of collateralized debt obligations that far exceeded
the firms' understanding of the risks inherent in such instruments."
Derivatives
Distinguished
Why
have the problems in the credit markets seemingly not spilled over
into the futures exchanges? It is an important question with some
very sobering answers.
Consider: In stark contrast to the turmoil of recent events,
the CME clearinghouse has operated for more than 100 years without
failure. In 2007, the CME Clearing House cleared more than 2.8
billion contracts traded on the CME/CBOT, representing more than
a quadrillion dollars in notional value terms. In December 2007,
The BIS Quarterly Report explained some of the dramatic differences
between the OTC and exchange traded derivatives:
• The
OTC derivatives market greatly overshadows exchange-traded
futures instruments. One reason is that in futures an offsetting
position eliminates the original contracts, not so in the OTC
market where the original contract remains in place increasing
the total size of the market.
• OTC
markets generally lack the regulatory control of federal authorities
to which futures and options exchanges are subject.
• OTC
markets do not have the protective components of the futures
exchanges, namely: Daily mark-to-the-market value adjustments,
margin deposits, price and position limits, and most notably
the guaranty of a central clearing house.
• While
OTC derivatives may take place on multilateral trading platforms,
clearing and settlement is by its very nature bi-lateral --- this
means OTC derivatives are not assets that can be traded freely.
• Contracts
with different counterparties are usually not fungible which
makes it difficult for traders to close positions. Contracts
often have long maturities, and counterparty risk a much greater
concern in OTC derivatives markets than in securities markets.
• Finally,
OTC derivatives contracts may themselves be very complex, involving
payments that depend on prices of other assets.4
These differences
are dramatic. While no system is perfect and no one can foresee
all eventualities, these structures and procedures at regulated
futures exchanges represent a time-tested mechanism --- the very
essence of their default-free success. On regulated exchanges,
not only are disclosure and transparency the hallmarks of their
transaction and clearing mechanisms, there can be no doubt
about the integrity of their daily settlement procedures. Even
in the most distant Eurodollar contract at the CME --- priced ten
years into the future --- there exists a real price established
every day in a notoriously open forum-now primarily Globex.
In futures no artificial pricing can occur. There is no "mark to modeling." To
be specific, the exchange clearinghouse system of multilateral
clearing and settlement provides:
• Central Counterparty Clearing (CCP), with a central guarantee
to every transaction --- eliminating counterparty credit risk;
• Transparency of valuation with twice daily (at the CME) mark-to-market
disciplines --- eliminating accumulation of debt;
• Real
time confirmation from a trusted counterparty directly to
the back office and the risk manager --- risk management
systems know the trade the moment it is done. No confirmation
means no trade.
• Daily
payment of settlement variation and margining --- making it difficult
for traders to hide losses or disguise unusual profits.
• Regulatory
oversight and financial surveillance procedures --- the antithesis
to the largely unregulated OTC market
Conclusion
Warren
Buffet, the world's most respected investor, offered the best
assessment of the cause of today's economic problems: He compared
money managers who promised double-digit returns to the queen
in Alice in Wonderland who proclaimed "Why,
sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before
breakfast." Just
like the queen, he explained, "Just about all Americans
came to believe that house prices would forever rise." That
conviction made one's income and savings unimportant. Lenders
offered a seemingly unending funnel of money to borrowers "confident
that house appreciation would cure all problems." Today,
we are experiencing the pain of that impossible belief.
University
of Yale, Professor Robert J. Shiller, summed it up this way: "The
failure to recognize the housing bubble is the core reason
for the collapsing house of cards we are seeing in financial
markets in the US and around the world. If people do not see
any risk and only the prospect of outsized investment returns,
they will pursue those returns with disregard for the risk.
In conclusion, I want to leave you with this thought:
Neither derivatives nor the markets are to be blamed for the
problems the world faces today. The markets as well as derivatives
are tools --- mechanisms that perform an important function without
which the world cannot advance or prosper. The tools are innocent.
They are applied by human beings. Don't blame the tools for the
actions of fools.
Thank you.
1BIS Quarterly Review, December 2007.
2Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan, before the Futures Industry
Association, Boca Raton, Florida, March 19, 1999.
3 In 1988-89, two bankers at Citigroup launched the first two
such structures called Alpha Finance Corp. and Beta Finance Corp.
In 1993, the bankers formed Gordian Knot to become the world's
largest SIV with some $57 billion in assets.
4BIS Quarterly Review, December 2007.
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