|
THE
NEED FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
Presented
at the Mid-America Institute's Conference Series of Risk Management,
Chicago, Illinois,
May 30, 1990.

Risk
management, as an orthodox discipline of business, is a relatively
new concept. It came into being during the last two decades
in concert with the development of a vast array of innovative
financial instruments, techniques, information technologies,
and the development of financial futures and options.
In
great measure financial futures and options owe their phenomenal
success to the recognition and acceptance by the commercial
world of the concept of risk management. That this process
occurred as quickly and successfully as it did is primarily
due to the profound efforts and influence of the U.S. academic
community.
Of
particular note in this intellectual endeavor is Merton H.
Miller, the Robert R. McCormick Distinguished Service Professor
of the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
His contribution to the genre of risk management was partially
responsible for his selection in 1990, together with Harry
Markowitz and William Sharpe, as the Nobel Laureate in Economics.

Walter
B. Wriston, referring to the revolutionary changes in our civilization
brought about the marriage between computer technology and telecommunications,
described it as the information revolution. Information— and
to some degree, knowledge—is today transmitted at lightening
speed to every corner of the planet. Consequently, the velocity
of social and political change has greatly accelerated, the sanctity
of every political power structure is in question, separate economies
are being forged into one global marketplace, and the traditional
regime of financial management is in transformation. Indeed,
the consequences are dramatic, draconian, and global. Dr. Carver
Mead of the California Institute of Technology said it this way: "The
entire Industrial Revolution enhanced productivity by a factor
of about a hundred, but the microelectronic revolution has already
enhanced productivity in information-based technology by a factor
of more than a million—and the end isn't in sight yet."
Two
decades ago, financial risk was apt to be defined as the possibility
of suffering financial loss. At that time, it was doubtful many
thought of risk management as a discipline, nor was it likely
that many outside of academia or the actuarial business spent
much time tinkering with mathematical models in order to weigh
different strains of strategic exposure; i.e., a firm's
sensitivity to changes in tax rates, interest rates, exchange
rates, the price of oil, etc. Two decades ago, the identifiable
risks were the rough equivalent of what Claude Rains in the final
scenes of Casablanca told his lackeys: "round up the
usual suspects." Farmers, for example, have always been at the
mercy of the weather. Beyond that, there were all the usual insurable
risks: fire, theft, natural disasters, etc. And while recessions
came and went, it was an era in which Treasury instruments yielded
about 5 percent and foreign exchange rates were fixed.
Today,
by virtue of Mr. Wriston's information revolution, "we are witnessing
a galloping new system of international finance" . . .one that
differs radically from its precursors" in that, as he notes,
it "was not built by politicians, economists, central bankers
or finance ministers. . .it was built by technology. . .by men
and women who interconnected the planet with telecommunications
and computers. . .and assembled a global financial marketplace
that would. . .as a first step. . .replace the Bretton Woods
agreements. . .with a new international monetary system governed
by the Information Standard." Defined in the context of the world
of commerce as we know it in the 1990s, risk is not merely a
potential drought, earthquake, gas leak or even oil spill. In
today's interdependent world: Where two contaminated grapes are
found in Philadelphia and, a hemisphere away, Chilean farmers
suffer $100 million in losses as a result; Where Europeans worry
about growth hormones fed to cattle and American beef growers
suffer the consequences; Where Bundesbank monetary policy must
be weighed right along with that of the Fed; Where a head tax
imposed in London can affect the corporate bottom line every
bit as readily as a value-added tax levied by Washington; Where
a drop in the Nikkei average can trigger a decline in every other
stock market in the world; Where the U.S. budget and trade deficits
impact not just the American economy, but the economies of all
nations and all those who are business participants; Where the
coming of Europe 1992 is not just a national or even a pan-European
issue, but one that has profound investment and trade implications
to every businessman; Where the revolutionary events in Eastern-Europe
and Russia structurally change the strategy of all commerce and
commercial enterprise; and, Where every action in any part of
the world is immediately known by everyone else.
In
such a world, risk is radically more complicated, intensely more
concentrated and devastatingly swift. Risk, today, is any one
of a myriad of contingencies that could negatively impact an
enterprise, thereby altering either its value, its cash flow,
or its future. More globalization, greater interdependence, immediate
access to markets of choice, more sophisticated techniques, intensified
competition—these are clearly the trends of the future. In a
word, the management of risk has became integral to our well
being. However, while risk management as a discipline may be
new, the idea of managing risk is anything but new. Nor did the
idea originate in Chicago.
The
European trade fairs in the 1100s became the commercial marketplaces
of medieval Europe and established Lettres de faire as
the early mechanism for forward contracting. A couple of hundred
years later, Lloyd's Coffee House became a central meeting place
in London for individuals involved in marine insurance—and incidentally
insurance against "house-breaking and death by gin-drinking." In
the late 1600s, in Osaka, Japan, the feudal clans that had established
warehouses to store and sell rice collected as land tax realized
they needed protection from wide harvest-to-harvest price fluctuations.
These feudal lord merchants did the sensible thing and established
the first organized futures exchange—the Dojima Rice Market.
As a consequence, Osaka became the leading commercial Japanese
city of that era. However, to find the real source of risk management,
one must regress some 5000 years in history to when Joseph convinced
the Pharaoh to arrange for the first long grain hedge in order
to protect against the coming seven years of lean.
American
futures history, on the other hand, extends back to the mid-nineteenth
century. Indeed, by time of the Great Fire of 1871, Chicago had
already become this country's hub of transportation. As a consequence,
merchants who dealt in raw commodities gathered in Chicago to
contract for them—buying and selling in both a spot and forward
fashion. It was inevitable that these merchants would soon think
along the same lines as their earlier counterparts in London
or Osaka.
The
first centralized trading facility to serve part of this market
was the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) established in 1848. Initially
its membership was comprised of the actual grain merchants; but
soon it was clear that commodity trading presented attractive
opportunities to speculators as well. Indeed, just as Adam Smith
explained, speculators—in pursuing their own interests—were making
the markets more liquid and stable.
The
second Chicago exchange, founded on South Water Street in 1874,
traded butter, eggs, poultry and other farm products. By the
end of World War I, the Butter and Egg Board (as it was then
called), had evolved into the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).
Seventy years later, annual trading volume at the CME would exceed
100 million contracts. But on December 1, 1919, the first day
of trading at the new CME, volume was a bit more modest. Only
three cars of eggs were traded.
In
the early 1970s, the Bretton Woods Agreement—the post-world war
pact that instituted a fixed-exchange rate regime for the major
world nations— had begun to show its structural flaw. Finance
ministers were finding it increasingly difficult to dictate the
value of currencies relative the dollar in a world where value
changes were constant and information and capital free flowing.
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced an emergency economic
package that sent a seismic shock through the entire financial
world. On that day, the United States suspended the dollar's
convertibility into gold thereby ending fixed exchange rates
between currencies.
The
Chicago Mercantile Exchange was the first major futures exchange
to recognize the market potential of the upheavals unleashed
by this event. Supported by Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, the
CME was the first exchange to assert that the principles of agricultural
commodities futures could be applied successfully to financial
instruments. Thus, currency futures—which began trading on the
CME's International Monetary Market (IMM) on May 16, 1972—ushered
in the era of financial futures, thereby forever changing the
scope and utility of futures markets. One year later, the Chicago
Board of Trade launched the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)
and added a new dimension to the repertoire of risk management
instruments. Three years later, Treasury bond futures at the
Chicago Board of Trade made their debut and became the most actively-traded
financial instrument. Within a decade, a vibrant new industry
was born that subsequently opened the curtain on the index markets
of the 1980s. The successes of these markets propelled the futures
and options industry to unparalleled greatness. In the last decade
alone, the volume in U.S. futures and options skyrocketed from
76 million contracts in 1979 to a record of 323 million contracts
in 1989. These successes also prompted University of Chicago
Professor Merton H. Miller, 1990 Nobel laureate in Economics,
to nominate financial futures as "the most significant financial
innovation of the last twenty years."
Chicago,
with its rich history and tradition of forward marketing, insurers
and reinsurers, with its innovative banks, and its robust futures
and options exchanges will remain the risk management capital
of the world. However, aside from providing Chicago with an enviable
local economic engine, there are three additional direct consequences
that resulted from the need the Chicago markets demonstrated:
it provided an impetus for the development of futures markets
worldwide; it spawned the introduction of risk management as
a discipline; and it spurred the devolvement of secondary off-exchange
products. All three consequences were predictable.
Clearly,
our Chicago successes could not go unnoticed. Indeed, our very
markets themselves began to be replicated all over the world.
During this past decade, new financial futures exchanges have
opened or been announced in London, Paris, Hong Kong, Sydney,
Toronto, Singapore, New Zealand, Brazil, Osaka, Zurich, Dublin,
Frankfurt and Tokyo. Four years ago, there were fifty-two exchanges
worldwide, now there are seventy-two. Non-U.S. futures and options
volume increased from virtually zero just five years ago to a
record volume of 180 million contracts last year. During the
same five years, U.S. market share fell from nearly 100% of total
world volume to 64% in 1989.
By
becoming integral to the financial landscape of the U.S. and
the international establishment, futures and options markets
gained an ever-increasing universe of users. Consequently, these
markets are today utilized by investment bankers and broker-dealers,
by foreign exchange traders and government securities dealers,
by banks and insurance companies, by pension funds and mutual
funds, and by corporations and financial institutions of every
sort. Indeed, futures and options markets became a common denominator
for professional money managers worldwide, providing impetus
for expanded utilization of these markets generally and acting
as catalyst for the development of the risk management regime.
The
liquid markets of the established futures and options exchanges
became a crucible of ideas for off-exchange products. Banks,
in particular, became key players in an expanding off-exchange
market for hybrid products such as interest-rate swaps and caps,
forward rate agreements, floors and collars, etc.; not to speak
of off-exchange trading systems and techniques for exchange products,
the Exchange For Physicals (EFPs). While these hybrids represent
somewhat of a threat and a liquidity drain to the exchange markets,
in the final analysis, off-exchange products result in producing
more business for the broad underlying exchange-traded instruments.
For instance, both in swaps as well as in caps, a bank will shed
its assumed interest rate exposure by hedging in the indicated
futures market. In the future, we can expect innovation to intensify,
and the demand for tailored risk management strategies to increase.
This may tend to blur the lines between exchange-traded and off-exchange-traded
products. It is important to note, however, that exchange-traded
products have one additional important advantage for the financial
community to consider, they provide a built-in mechanism for
risk assessment. The financial risk of recent innovative instruments
applied in an off-exchange environment makes them nearly impossible
to be measured and poses a great unknown financial risk to the
banking community.
The
Chicago exchanges were never laggards in innovation or intimidated
by competition. Indeed, in 1984, the CME recognized that the
financial world was at the threshold of Wriston's technological
revolution—one that would increase international competition
for our markets—and became the first futures exchange to establish
a mutual-offset trading link with a foreign exchange—the Singapore
International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Similarly, the CBOT,
instituted a successful evening session for its U.S. Treasury
bond futures contract.
The
CME ultimately concluded that the futures industry must make
the giant leap toward automated technology if it is to respond
to the demands of globalization. Thus, in 1986, in conjunction
with Reuters Holdings PLC, the CME set about developing GLOBEX.
GLOBEX represents the logical extension of the financial futures
revolution that began in 1972 with the IMM. It is the only realistic
response to the information revolution which demands there be
an efficient and cost-effective capability for managing risk
around-the-clock. In conjunction with the open outcry sessions
of the American business hours, GLOBEX will provide investors
around the world with a single, 24-hour futures and options trading
system.
Our
goal is to make GLOBEX the premier international futures and
options trading system and the standard for the world. Toward
that goal, MATIF, the Paris-based Marche a Terme International
de France, was the first exchange to become a GLOBEX partner.
Most importantly, however, last week, on May 23, 1990, the Chicago
Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange successfully
completed their extensive discussions pertaining to a unified
after-hours electronic trading system, and announced a plan whereby
both exchanges would utilize the GLOBEX network and technology.
This agreement followed the announcement by the Japanese Ministry
of Finance that GLOBEX was approved for Japan. Thus, subject
to final agreement by Reuters Holdings PLC, GLOBEX will some
day become the electronic trading system for over 75% of the
world's financial futures and options when it becomes operational.
The
agreement between the two Chicago exchanges proved once again
that Chicago's "I can" tradition is alive and well. Indeed, we
have helped transform this city from Carl Sandburg's Hog Butcher
for the World to today's capital of risk management. But much
more than that. The futures and options exchanges of Chicago—light
years ahead of their counterparts in securities—have led the
capital markets of this nation into the next century. In doing
so, we have exemplified the innovative genius of the American
people and created the tools with which risk—a permanent fixture
of modern business—can better be managed. The rest is up to you.
Return
to top of page | Return to
Index | Home Page
|